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Abstract: In Plato’s corpus, the Greek word ἐξαίϕνης appears precisely thirty-six times. Translated
generally as “all of a sudden” or “the instant” in his Parmenides, ἐξαίϕνης emerges in some of the
most significant passages of Plato’s dialogues. Put simply, ἐξαίϕνης connotes illumination of the
highest realities and philosophical conversion experience. In addition to providing a review of
Plato’s conception and use of ἐξαίϕνης in Parmenides, Republic, Symposium, and the Seventh Letter,
our paper brings an ancillary link to light. Namely, the appearance of ἐξαίϕνης as a mark for
conversion experiences in the New Testament’s Acts of the Apostles and Plotinus’s Enneads. We
reveal how the same pattern and employment of ἐξαίϕνης established by Plato emerge in both Acts
and the Enneads. This pattern suggests a prolonged period of thinking and training, followed by a
flash of understanding. Thus ἐξαίϕνης, as evidenced by our survey of its strange instantiation in
Plato’s dialogues and then subsequently in Acts and the Enneads, becomes a sign for enlightenment,
assimilation with the divine, and conversion experience.
Keywords: conversion experience; illumination; training; suddenly; participation; ideas; excellence;
beauty itself; the good
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1. Introduction
Will this be our life-long work, simply to convert to the pursuit of excellence
those who have not yet converted so that they in turn may convert others?
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The earliest known civilization in human history tells of the dramatic conversion of
Gilgamesh. Gilgamesh ruled the magnificent city of Uruk with a tyrannical hand. Half
God and half mortal, he terrorized all who opposed him, ruling by fear rather than by
law. When his only friend, Enkidu, was killed, Gilgamesh plunged into the depths of
depression. The thought of life-ending mortality seemed incomprehensible to him. After
days of inconsolable grief, he vowed to conquer death itself by seeking the one mortal who
was granted eternal life—Utnapishtim, the sole survivor of the great Sumerian flood. On
his quest, he was warned: “No man born of woman has done what you have asked. No
mortal man has gone into the mountain with its twelve leagues of darkness. In it there
is no light, and the heart is oppressed with darkness”. Gilgamesh resolved to take the
arduous journey through 36 miles of dark depression, weakened physically and mentally
distraught, until he finally saw the light. A lovely spirit guide said to him:
“Gilgamesh, where are you hurrying to? You will never find the life you are
looking for. When the gods created man they allotted to him death, but life they
retained for their own keeping. As for you, Gilgamesh, fill your belly with good
things; day and night, dance, be merry, rejoice. Let your clothes be fresh, bathe
yourself in water, cherish the little child that holds your hand, and make your
wife happy in your embrace; for this too is the lot of man”.

4.0/).
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Gilgamesh’s quest for immortality was unsuccessful. It was just beyond his grasp, and
according to the cuneiform tablets, he accepted his fate and returned to Uruk. But he was
then different. The arduous journey did not grant him immortality, but Gilgamesh did
achieve an illumination of the human condition, and by this measure, he experienced a
conversion experience, a reorientation of his life.
Examples of reorientation—conversion experiences—abound in ancient literature,
from Gilgamesh to St. Augustine in Book VIII of his Confessions (Augustine 1998). By
“conversion experience,” we mean a profound change from one way of life to another. In
other words, we use the term as it is commonly and etymologically understood, as a “turning around”.1 Gilgamesh underwent an ordeal, a demanding exercise, and as a result, he
gained an insight that prompted his return to Uruk, fate accepted, and the turning around
of his life’s purpose. In both religious and philosophical contexts, conversion involves a
fundamental change or reorientation in one’s way of life and values. The enlightened one
reorganizes her life and priorities according to a newly discovered conception of the good,
irrespective of whether the conception derives from a religious teaching or philosophical
reflection.2 Her perspective changes such that she now regards her previous values and
way of life as less valuable than they once seemed. Similarly, she now sees a new set of
values and way of life as more worthy than what formerly appeared.
Moreover, the convert recognizes such a reorientation as highly beneficial. In general,
then, conversion or illumination experiences embrace the notion of beneficial change, and
this is the operative meaning in the examples to follow. Thus, for the purposes of this
paper, we use the expressions “conversion experience” and “illumination experience”
interchangeably, and they simply designate a beneficial change from ignorance to wisdom,
sin to righteousness, from a worse way of life to a better one, or all of these at once.
Importantly, this notion of beneficial change is at play in Plato’s dialogues, and we shall
see Plato’s model materialize in subsequent ancient religious and philosophical texts as
evidenced by the appearance of the Greek ἐξαίϕνης.
Relative to the vast scholarship concerning the concepts and doctrines accepted
conventionally as key to understanding Plato’s philosophy, few examine his strange use of
ἐξαίϕνης.3 Translated generally as “suddenly” or in Parmenides as “the instant,” ἐξαίϕνης
surfaces in some of the most crucial and well-known passages of Plato’s dialogues. In
Republic VII, the liberated prisoner “suddenly” (ἐξαίϕνης) rises and looks up “toward the
light” of the Good (515c6–7). In his Seventh Letter, Plato describes philosophical illumination
as happening “suddenly” (ἐξαίϕνης), just as a scintillating flash issues forth from a newly
lit fire (341c8-d1). Likewise, in Symposium, the true lover, who, “in the right order and
correctly,” grasps beautiful things, “all of a sudden” (ἐξαίϕνης) catches a glimpse of
Beauty itself (210e6–211a1). While Plato’s Parmenides offers the only conceptually sustained,
thematic treatment of ἐξαίϕνης in the dialogues, the most remarkable examples of the
thirty-six appearances of ἐξαίϕνης in Plato’s works illustrate a methodical, step-by-step
process of philosophical education climaxing with a sudden and illuminating conversion
experience. Said another way, ἐξαίϕνης signifies the climax of the hard work entailed in
the rigorous Platonic dialectic.
In addition to providing a review of Plato’s conception and use of ἐξαίϕνης in Parmenides, Republic, Symposium, and the Seventh Letter, the following brings an ancillary link
to light, namely, the appearance of ἐξαίϕνης as a mark for conversion experiences in Acts
of the Apostles and Plotinus’s Enneads. We reveal how the same pattern and employment of ἐξαίϕνης established by Plato emerge in both Acts and the Enneads. Simply put,
this pattern suggests a prolonged period of thinking and training, followed by a flash of
understanding and conversion experience.
2. ᾿Εξαίϕνης in Plato’s Dialogues
᾿Εξαίϕνης appears fifty-nine times in extant Greek works previous to or contemporaneous with Plato. Homer’s Iliad features the earliest appearances. In addition to Homer,
ἐξαίϕνης appears in Aesop, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Thucydides, Herodotus,
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Isocrates, Aristophanes, and Xenophon, among others. Upon examining these passages,
the broad brushstrokes of a pattern emerge. Nearly every appearance of ἐξαίϕνης in
extant Greek literature prior to and contemporaneous with Plato reveals the following:
(1) a swift transformation or change and (2) negative consequences resulting from this swift
transformation or change. Thus, the appearances of ἐξαίϕνης prior to Plato show the term
held a menacing connotation.4 In other words, events happening “suddenly” generally
produced tragic results.
Plato maintains the element of transformation with respect to ἐξαίϕνης, but he reorients the tragic association typically accompanying the term. For Plato, ἐξαίϕνης becomes
a sign of enlightenment or illumination of the highest realities, e.g., the Platonic Forms
or Ideas. The lengthy character and intellectual training exemplifying Plato’s notion of
philosophical education reaches its zenith with a sudden reorientation, or conversion, of
the soul. Consequently, an understanding of Plato’s philosophical project and the protreptic nature of education requires a familiarity with Plato’s peculiar use of ἐξαίϕνης. In
what follows, we survey four instances of the term in Plato’s works, which illustrate how
ἐξαίϕνης represents reorientation and the peak of philosophical enlightenment.
2.1. ᾿Εξαίϕνης in Plato’s Parmenides
Plato’s Parmenides offers the only sustained treatment of ἐξαίϕνης in the dialogues.
A whole host of questions involving the Ideas and participation (µέθεξις) arise when
discussing Parmenides and the so-called “later dialogues,” e.g., Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, etc., and the purpose of this paper precludes a comprehensive examination of these
questions. Nevertheless, the nature of the ensuing analysis compels us to state our position
clearly and concisely regarding the status of the Ideas and participation. In general terms,
we maintain the Ideas are not merely isolated, standalone, and immoveable entities but
require a relational, interactive dynamic as well. In other words, the Ideas must in some
sense move and participate with each other.5 Despite the orthodox view concerning the
immobility of the Ideas, the Ideas considered in motu corresponds nicely with the Visitor’s
suggestive question from Plato’s Sophist 248e7–249a2: “But for heaven’s sake, are we going
to be convinced that it’s true that change, life, soul, and intelligence are not present in
that which wholly is, and that it neither lives nor thinks, but stays changeless, solemn, and
holy, without any understanding?” Furthermore, we contend participation is understood
best by taking a top-down approach, i.e., determining how the Ideas participate with each
other sheds lights on how all participants, including humans, might participate in the
Ideas. Finally, we maintain the Parmenides affirms the necessity of relational Ideas, and the
treatment of ἐξαίϕνης offers a key to understanding how the Ideas participate with one
another.6
Translated as “the sudden” or “the instant,” ἐξαίϕνης surfaces in the critical third
hypothesis of the training exercise constituting the latter two-thirds of the dialogue. While
interpretations of the dialogue vary considerably, most scholars agree the third hypothesis—
or “hypothesis IIa” or “appendix” or “insert hypothesis”—is highly significant.7 Again,
this is the only passage in all of Plato’s dialogues that explains the curious function and
phenomenon of ἐξαίϕνης. As the lone numbered hypothesis, the ἐξαίϕνης section of
Parmenides commences rather strangely: “Let’s speak of it yet a third (τρίτoν) time,” begins
Parmenides (155e4).8 A few moments later, Parmenides employs rest and motion to identify
the perplexities surrounding transition from one state to another. Because, as Parmenides
wonders, if something must always be either in motion or at rest, exactly “when” does this
transition occur? Since something must always be in either motion or rest, the moment of
change requires a suspension of both rest and motion to complete the transition. If change
cannot occur in time, then it must happen in “no time” at all.
Is there, then, this strange (ἄτoπoν) thing in which it might be, just when it
changes?—What strange (ἄτoπoν) thing?—The instant (τὸ ἐξαίϕνης). The instant (ἐξαίϕνης) seems to signify something such that changing occurs from it to
each of two states. For a thing doesn’t change from rest while rest continues, or
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from motion while motion continues. Rather, this strange creature (αὕτη ϕύσις
ἄτoπóς), the instant (ἐξαίϕνης), lurks between motion and rest—being in no
time at all—and to it and from it the moving thing changes to resting and the
resting thing changes to moving.—It looks that way.—And the one, if in fact it
both rests and moves, could change to each state—for only in this way could it do
both. But in changing, it changes at an instant (ἐξαίϕνης), and when it changes,
it would be in no time at all, and just then it would be neither in motion nor at
rest.—No, it wouldn’t. (156d1–156e7)
In other words, “the instant” (τὸ ἐξαίϕνης) of the third hypothesis of Parmenides allows
for and facilitates participation among the Ideas themselves, e.g., from rest to motion
and motion to rest. As Parmenides suggests, “this strange creature”—the instant (τὸ
ἐξαίϕνης)—makes change and participation among the Ideas possible. In τὸ ἐξαίϕνης, an
Idea would be neither at rest nor in motion, and this peculiar timelessness would provide
an “opening” through which the transition from motion to rest could proceed without
obtaining either rest or motion because neither state emerges in the instant.9 Thus, the
interplay or participation between and among the Ideas happens suddenly, in an instant
(ἐξαίϕνης).
The instant animates the Ideas as they move “into” and “out of” τὸ ἐξαίϕνης, and
when considered from this timeless perspective, the Ideas are the static, fixed, eternal
beings as conventionally understood. The Ideas, however, to be at all, must in some sense
move. In other words, any Idea must share or participate in Being in order to be. Thus,
an Idea must instantiate another Idea by way of participation through the instant. An Idea
participating in another Idea goes “outside itself,” so to speak, to another Idea, and thus, it
changes or undergoes a kind of transition from the limited one of the first hypothesis to
the unlimited one of the second hypothesis, only not at different times but eternally. The
Ideas must forever enter “within” and emerge “from” the timeless instant in order to be
or participate in Being itself.10 When considered from this perspective, i.e., while “in” the
instant, the Ideas are the conventionally understood eternal, timeless, unchanging Forms.
Changeable, perceptible things manifest this activity by becoming other (or changing)
temporally, and they are, “a moving image of eternity” (Timaeus, 37d5). Put another way,
the becoming of perceptible things mirrors the being of the intelligible Ideas. Ultimately, the
instant (τὸ ἐξαίϕνης) functions as the locus of this dynamic activity: participation.
As mentioned above, Parmenides presents the only sustained, thematic treatment of
ἐξαίϕνης in the dialogues, but as demonstrated in the brief survey below, Plato consistently employs ἐξαίϕνης in celebrated passages of other dialogues, and we contend these
appearances signify human cognition or participation with the Ideas. While in the Parmenides, “the instant” symbolizes metaphysical change and participation among the Ideas,
its emergence in other dialogues signifies psychological change as humans catch sight of the
Ideas and reorient their lives.
2.2. ᾿Εξαίϕνης in Republic
Justice and goodness enliven the discussion in Plato’s Republic. To establish goodness
in Kallipolis, the beautiful city, the philosopher-king must become good or see the Good
(τὸ ἀγαθóν), as he alone will possess the requisite training and capacity “to embrace
the thing itself” (480a10–11). Plato both describes the training prosaically, e.g., rigorous
studies in arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, practical political affairs, etc., and poetically
in Republic VII. The poetic account of the philosopher-king’s training constitutes the most
famous myth in Plato’s corpus and probably the most well-known passage in the history
of philosophy: the allegory of the cave. The cave allegory represents the crowning moment
of the philosopher-king’s education and training, and if participation does indeed happen
in an instant, then one could anticipate an appearance of ἐξαίϕνης in Republic VII.
The allegory of the cave begins with Socrates’s “strange (ἄτoπoν) image” of “strange
(ἁτóπoυς) prisoners” who are held captive in a cave and unaware of the illusions making
up their shared reality (515a2). Socrates claims his tale concerns the “effect of education
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and of the lack of it on our nature,” and perhaps most chillingly: these “strange” prisoners
are just “like us” (514a1–2 and 515a2). Fortuitously, a prisoner becomes unchained, and
ἐξαίϕνης appears at this moment of liberation. Unbound and “suddenly” (ἐξαίϕνης)
forced to rise, the prisoner struggles to turn his head and “look up toward the light”
(515c6–7). The prisoner is “pained and irritated” when forced up the “rough, steep path”
out of the cave and into the sunlight (515e5–7). Before long, he would see the sun itself
and grasp how it directs and “governs everything in the visible world” (516b4–8). He
would understand the sun, i.e., the Good, causes all things. He would know the Idea
of the Good, acknowledging it as the source of “truth and understanding” and all that
is “correct and beautiful” (517c1–4). Ultimately, Plato’s use of ἐξαίϕνης at the precise
moment of liberation in the cave allegory reflects its appearance in Parmenides. Sudden
change is operative in both. In Parmenides, τὸ ἐξαίϕνης symbolizes participation as the
Ideas separate and combine with each other, while in the allegory of the cave, ἐξαίϕνης
signifies the moment when the philosopher “ascends that ascent” and sees the Good itself
(519a10).11
2.3. ᾿Εξαίϕνης in Symposium
Plato’s encomium to love (ἔρως), Symposium, finds Socrates introducing a soothsayer
from Mantinea, a woman named Diotima, who taught him the “art of love” (τὰ ἐρωτικά)
(201d2–5). ᾿Εξαίϕνης emerges in Symposium right before Diotima reveals the goal of
all loving. She insists that Socrates “pay attention” as she proceeds to disclose how
“all of a sudden” (ἐξαίϕνης) the properly guided lover will “catch sight” of something
“wonderfully beautiful” (210e3–7).
Diotima’s account of the true nature of love concludes with an erotic ascension—
parallel to the ascent described in the allegory of the cave—and the revelation of “the final
and highest mystery” (210a3). According to Diotima, the lover desires one body and gives
birth to beautiful ideas, and this, in turn, leads him to acknowledge the beauty of all bodies.
He then realizes that beautiful souls possess even more beauty than bodies, and the beauty
of these souls is due to the laws and customs of the city. Next, his gaze centers upon the
many kinds of knowledge cultivating the beautiful customs and laws. Recognizing the
beauty of knowledge itself, he is inspired to give birth to “many gloriously beautiful ideas
and theories, in unstinting love of wisdom” (210d1–6). At this point, Diotima instructs
Socrates to listen closely as she is about to reveal the purpose to those who have been
guided thus far in “matters of love” (τὰ ἐρωτικά) (210e4).12 The true lover, who “in the
right order and correctly,” grasped beautiful things will “all of a sudden” (ἐξαίϕνης) catch
a glimpse of something divine: Beauty itself (210e6–211a1).13 Unlike beautiful things,
Beauty itself always is, and in phrasing reminiscent of the training exercise of Parmenides,
Diotima claims Beauty itself “neither comes to be nor passes away, neither waxes nor
wanes” (211a2–3).14 Beauty itself is “always one in form” and unconditionally beautiful
and “not anywhere,” as it is remains “itself by itself with itself” (αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτó) (211b1–3).
The lover begins with beautiful things, and “using them like rising stairs,” ascends to
Beauty itself, and finally, “he comes to know just what it is to be beautiful” (211c4–8).15 Thus,
Diotima’s account of love and the Beautiful climaxes with the lover assimilating to the
beloved: Beauty itself. “If any human being could become immortal,” Diotima concludes,
then it would be him “who has given birth to true virtue and nourished it” (212a8–212b1).
Hence, ἐξαίϕνης appears at the highpoint of the Symposium as Plato describes a spiritual
awakening or illumination experience.
2.4. ᾿Εξαίϕνης in Seventh Letter
Plato’s Seventh Letter illustrates the power and necessity of friendship. In his opening
address to “the friends and followers of Dion,” Plato attempts to persuade the supporters
of the now deceased Dion to refrain from a violent revolt against the Syracuse regime
headed by Dionysius II.16 In doing so, Plato offers an autobiographical account of his own
political ambitions as a young man and his and Dion’s prior attempts at reforming both
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Syracuse and the whole of Sicily by instituting the best laws.17 Following a brief description
of the aftermath of the Peloponnesian war and the events leading to the execution of his
“friend Socrates” (325b6), Plato reveals that through reflection and maturity, he realized “it
was impossible to do anything without friends” (325d1).18
Amid what secondary sources often refer to as the “epistemological digression,”
Plato introduces the “true doctrine” (λóγoς ἀληθής)—a methodical, step-by-step process
examining name, definition, image, knowledge, and the object itself—which generates
ascending levels of understanding (342a3). He claims he has explained the true doctrine
before, but he elects to explain it once more so the friends of Dion might gain a better
understanding of philosophical education. The earnest back-and-forth, give-and-take
discussion of friends doing philosophy is crucial. In the end, progress in the true doctrine
results in a conversion of sorts insofar as this philosophical friendship generates a life of selfsustained philosophical activity. Plato depicts the shared intensity and central aim of the
friendship as follows: “after long-continued intercourse between teacher and pupil in joint
pursuit of the subject, suddenly (ἐξαίϕνης), like light flashing forth when a fire is kindled,
it is born in the soul and straightaway nourishes itself” (341c8-d1). Thus, friendship
and philosophical education sparks a sudden (ἐξαίϕνης) illumination experience.19 The
transformation of the true doctrine’s participant commences a new beginning as the
participant emerges “on fire with philosophy” and capable of self-sustained study.20
2.5. The Meaning of ᾿Εξαίϕνης in Plato’s Works
While the fifty-nine appearances of ἐξαίϕνης in extant Greek literature prior to and
contemporaneous with Plato often evince a foreboding quality, Plato’s use of “the sudden” demonstrates a radical shift in meaning and significance. In the Seventh Letter,
ἐξαίϕνης represents the sudden illumination experience stimulating and solidifying the
philosopher’s desire to pursue wisdom with a burning enthusiasm, just as ἐξαίϕνης in
the Symposium signifies the sudden revelation of Beauty itself. The allegory of the cave
from Republic VII finds ἐξαίϕνης marking the moment of emancipation as the prisoner is
compelled suddenly to look toward the light of the Good itself, while in Plato’s Parmenides,
ἐξαίϕνης functions as the “the instant”—the peculiar place of participation—eternally
animating the Ideas. Thus, Plato alters the significance of ἐξαίϕνης and transforms it into a
symbol for the sudden flash of insight that crystallizes the climactic conversion experience
engendered by philosophical education.21
The most remarkable examples of the thirty-six appearances of ἐξαίϕνης in Plato’s
works illustrate a methodical, step-by-step process of philosophical education climaxing
with a sudden and dramatic conversion experience. This conversion experience mirrors
the way the Ideas participate with each other in “the instant” (τὸ ἐξαίϕνης) of the third
hypothesis of Parmenides. The flash of illumination—“this strange creature” (αὕτη ϕύσις
ἄτoπóς)—constitutes the peak of the disciplined, orderly climb exemplified by the hard
work of character and intellectual training involved in philosophical education. The sudden
and striking reorientation “turns the whole soul until it is able to study that which is and
the brightest thing that is, namely, the one we call the Good” (Republic VII, 518c7-d1). If we
are diligent, thoughtful, and persistent with philosophical exercises, then with equal parts
good fortune and good will, perhaps a strange and sudden insight might come to light.
3. ᾿Εξαίϕνης in Acts of the Apostles
The New Testament, composed originally in common (κoινῇ) Greek in the latter half
of the first century C.E. and early decades of the second, remains the foundational text
of Christianity. Because it was both written in antiquity and in Greek, it stands to reason
those figures of speech and tropes characteristic of the ancient Greek philosophical and
literary tradition would find their way into Christianity’s central text. A product of its time,
the New Testament’s emergence in antiquity determined its rhetorical and literary approach.
As Alexander (2001, p. 1029) reveals:
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Late first century philosophical literature shows that there was a real interest in
presenting the lives of the philosophers as templates for living the philosophical
life, especially the life (and even more the death) of the martyr-philosopher
Socrates. A number of details in Acts would recall this paradigm for Greekeducated readers.
One such detail is the use of ἐξαίϕνης. It appears five times in the New Testament, and all
the appearances bear a striking similarity to Plato’s use of the term.22 We highlight the two
appearances of ἐξαίϕνης in Acts to demonstrate the parallel with Plato.
Immediately following the canonical gospels, Acts serves to connect the gospels to
Paul’s letters. Largely thought to be written by the same Luke of the gospel tradition,
Acts presents a smooth transition from the life of Jesus Christ to the earliest Christian
community. It holds a special place as the link between Christ’s ministry in the gospels
and the nascent establishment of Christianity and subsequent proliferation of the religion
throughout the Greco-Roman world. The pivotal moment of Acts, and indeed Christianity
itself, involves Paul’s celebrated conversion experience on the road to Damascus.
This crucial moment mirrors the appearances of ἐξαίϕνης in Plato’s dialogues insofar
as it chronicles a conversion experience as an abrupt flash of understanding quite like
the sudden illumination experiences described in Plato’s Seventh Letter, Republic, and
Symposium.23 Acts 9 begins with Paul seeking letters from the high priest that would
implicate those belonging to a nascent form of Jewish Christianity called “the Way”. Paul
intends to marshal these early Christians in Damascus and return them to Jerusalem to
face persecution. Consequently, Acts 9:3 depicts Paul’s experience as follows: “And as
he journeyed, he came near Damascus: and suddenly (ἐξαίϕνης) there shined round
about him a light from heaven”. Jesus addresses Paul and questions his activities. Christ
then commands him to enter Damascus to await further instructions, “and for three days
[Paul] was without sight, and neither ate nor drank” (Acts 9:9). Paul’s transformation
is, as Alexander (2001, p. 1039) contends, “a complete change of direction” or simply, a
conversion experience.
Likewise, in Acts 22:6, Paul retells his sudden change of direction: “While I was
on my way and approaching Damascus, about noon a great light from heaven suddenly
(ἐξαίϕνης) shone about me”. Paul testifies this otherworldly light was “blinding” (Acts
22:11), just as the sun, i.e., the Good, dazzled the liberated prisoner in Plato’s allegory of the
cave.24 Furthermore, in much the same way that Plato describes the sudden reorientation of
the soul after a lengthy training process, Paul’s conversion, though sudden and miraculous,
was preceded by a preparative phase. “The actual explosion was sudden,” writes Ferris
1954, 118, “but there was a long fuse burning under the surface which had been lighted
years before, and gradually the flame crept nearer and nearer to the explosive center”. The
fact the author of Acts finds Paul’s sudden conversion experience in 9:3 worthy of restating
in 22:6 indicates its significance for both the ostensible author, Luke, and the early history
of Christianity. It is also highly suggestive insofar as these biblical verses parallel Plato’s
paradigm: prolonged period of thinking, sudden (ἐξαίϕνης) illumination experience, and
profound reorientation.
4. ᾿Εξαίϕνης in Plotinus’ Enneads
The Platonist par excellence of late antiquity, Plotinus, exhibits a similar employment
of ἐξαίϕνης. Though Plotinus’s treatment of ἐξαίϕνης is comparatively limited—it materializes in his Enneads only nine times—the positioning of these appearances in contexts
mirroring those found in Plato’s dialogues suggests, perhaps at the very least, an homage
of sorts. In what follows, we demonstrate Plotinus’s corresponding treatment of ἐξαίϕνης
to reveal how it functions as a key term in his philosophical project.
Like Plato, Plotinus inserts ἐξαίϕνης in passages depicting the peak of philosophical
enlightenment. Many of these appearances relate to the vision of the One, or Good. Plotinus
unveils the uniformity of the One and the Good in II.9.5–6: “When we speak of the One
and when we speak of the Good we must recognize an identical nature; we must affirm
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that they are the same”. The Plotinian One-Good unites the One of Plato’s Parmenides and
the Good from Republic.25 As noted above, both Parmenides and Republic feature significant
appearances of ἐξαίϕνης. Rather than considering himself an originator of a distinct
philosophy, however, Plotinus viewed his life’s work as bringing Platonism to its full and
most explicit fruition. In what follows below, we isolate five appearances of ἐξαίϕνης from
Enneads V and VI to disclose how Plotinus utilizes this term in ways strikingly similar to
those from Plato’s dialogues featured above (Plotinus 1984).
4.1. ᾿Εξαίϕνης in Enneads V.3: “On the Knowing Hypostases and That Which Is Beyond”
The fifth Ennead as assembled and arranged by Plotinus’s student, Porphyry, concerns
self-knowledge and intelligible reality. Here, Plotinus ruminates on the relation between
human intellect and the Divine Intellect itself. On the one hand, he does not consider it
“strange” (ἄτoπoν) to conclude the soul lacks the capacity to think itself. On the other
hand, it would indeed be “strange” (ἄτoπoν) to conclude the intellect lacks this capacity
for self-knowing (V.1.18–19).
V.1 illuminates the three primary hypostases or transcendent sources of reality, i.e.,
the One-Good, the Divine Intellect, and the World Soul, while V.2 sheds further light on the
doctrine and clarifies the continuity of Plotinus’s emanation theory. Plotinus then explains
how the human intellect unites with the Divine Intellect in V.3 and how this unity relates
to self-knowledge.26 Nevertheless, this is not the terminus of Plotinus’s project. Ultimately,
one must move beyond the Divine Intellect and embrace the One-Good. The conclusion
of Ennead V’s third tractate (V.3.17) depicts this immediate and ineffable illumination
experience:
The soul runs over all truths, and all the same shuns the truths we know if
someone tries to express them in words and discursive thought; for discursive
thought, in order to express anything in words, has to consider one thing after
another: this is the method of description; but how can one describe the absolutely
simple? But it is enough if the intellect comes into contact with it; but when it
has done so, while the contact lasts, it is absolutely impossible, nor has it time
to speak; but it is afterwards that it is able to reason about it. One must believe
when one has seen, when the soul suddenly (ἐξαίϕνης) takes light: for this is
from him and he is it; we must think that he is present when, like another god
whom someone called to his house, he comes and brings light to us: for if he had
not come, he would not have brought the light.
Echoing the ἐξαίϕνης examples in Plato’s works, Plotinus offers an account of a noetic
ascent climaxing with sudden enlightenment. In Plato’s Symposium, Diotima describes the
“sudden” (ἐξαίϕνης) emergence of Beauty itself leading one to know “just what it is to
be beautiful,” while Plotinus speaks of the soul “suddenly” (ἐξαίϕνης) experiencing the
One-Good and reasoning afterwards about what it means to be good.27
4.2. ᾿Εξαίϕνης in Enneads V.5: “That Intelligibles Are Not Outside the Intellect, and the Good”
Likewise, in V.5.3, Plotinus equates the vision of the One-Good, i.e., “the First,” with
a hierarchical sequence of beauty analogous to the ladder of love passages from Plato’s
Symposium:
For the First in its progress could not take its stand upon something soulless,
nor immediately upon Soul, but there must be an inconceivable beauty going
out before it, as in the procession before a great king the lesser ranks go first,
and then in succession the greater and after them the yet more majestic and the
court which has still more of royal dignity, and then those who are honored next
after the king; and after all these the great king himself is suddenly (ἐξαίϕνης)
revealed, and the people pray and prostrate themselves before him.
In V.5.7, Plotinus writes of Divine Intellect coalescing with the One in a mystical fusion:
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Just so Intellect, veiling itself from other things and drawing itself inward, when it
is not looking at anything will see a light, not a distinct light in something different
from itself, but suddenly (ἐξαίϕνης) appearing, alone by itself in independent
purity, so that Intellect is at a loss to know whence it has appeared, whether it has
come from outside or within, and after it has gone away will say, ‘It was within,
and yet it was not within.’
The above passages reflect accounts of mystical experiences generally insofar as they depict
the spiritual synthesis obtaining between what once were two separate entities. Hadot 1998,
58, describes this spiritual event—the union of self and the One-Good—as founded upon
the equivalence of the One-Good and the self’s “pure, simple, undecomposable presence”.
Stated another way, this spiritual synthesis equates to Platonic participation.
4.3. ᾿Εξαίϕνης in Enneads VI.7: “The Forms and the Good”
In VI.7.34, Plotinus describes further the soul’s assimilation with the One-Good. The
passage below presents the most explicit integration of soul and the Good in the Plotinian
corpus. “Once the soul has no more possessions, and has stripped herself of all form,”
writes Hadot 1998, 57, “she is at one with the object of her love and becomes the Good. She is
the Good”. Again, the soul’s assimilation to the Good parallels with Platonic participation,
especially with Diotima’s account in Symposium. Like Plato, Plotinus captures the abrupt
nature of this event with ἐξαίϕνης:
But when the soul has good fortune with it, and it comes to it, or rather, being
there already, appears, when that soul turns away from the things that are there,
and has prepared by making itself as beautiful as possible and has come to
likeness—the preparation and the adornment are clearly understood, I think, by
those who are preparing themselves—and it sees it in itself suddenly (ἐξαίϕνης)
appearing—for there is nothing between, nor are there still two but both are one;
nor could you still make a distinction while it is present; lovers and their beloveds
here below imitate this in their will to be united—it does not still perceive its
body, that it is in it, and does not speak of itself as anything else, not man, or
living thing, or being, or all, for the contemplation of these would be somehow
disturbing, and it has no time for them nor wants them, but it has been seeking
it, and meets that when it is present, and looks at that instead of itself; but it
has not even time to see who the soul is that looks. There, truly, it would not
exchange this for anything in the world, not even if someone handed over the
whole universe to it, because there is nothing still better, and nothing that is more
a good; for it does not run up higher, and all the other things are on its way down,
even if they are in the realm of above. So then it has the ability to judge rightly
and to know that this is what it desired, and to establish that there is nothing
better than it.
The inclusion of ἐξαίϕνης and the poetic construal of “both are one” suggests Platonic
participation. Furthermore, the above passage might very well be an instance of Plotinus
hinting at his own mystical experiences. According to Porphyry, Plotinus achieved this
mystical union four times during his life. Plotinus himself states in Enneads IV.8.1: “Many
times it has happened: Lifted out of the body into myself; becoming external to all other
things; beholding a marvelous beauty; then, more than ever, assured of community with
the loftiest order; living the noblest life, acquiring identity with the Divine”. Again, the
context and language reflect the passages from Plato’s dialogues that suggest participation
with the Idea as happening “all of a sudden” (ἐξαίϕνης).
In addition, from “The Forms and the Good” Plotinus writes in VI.7.36:
It is there that one lets all study go; up to a point one has been led along and
settled firmly in beauty and as far as this one thinks that in which one is, but is
carried out of it by the surge of a wave of Intellect itself and lifted on high by a
kind of swell and sees suddenly (ἐξαίϕνης), not seeing how, but the vision fills
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his eyes with light and does not make him see something else by it, but the light
itself is what he sees.
Philosophical progress in Plotinus’s system generates the same sudden illumination experience as depicted in the ἐξαίϕνης passages of Plato’s dialogues. In his commentary on
the above passage from Ennead VI, Hadot 1998, 62, explains, “For Plotinus, as for Plato,
vision consists in contact between the inner light of the eye and exterior light. Yet Plotinus
concludes from this that when vision becomes spiritual, there is no longer any distinction
between inner and outer light”. This assimilation process—represented conceptually with
the appearance of ἐξαίϕνης—delineates Plotinus’s account of the soul’s ascent to the
divine described by Plato in the passages discussed above.
5. ᾿Εξαίϕνης in Plato, Acts, and Plotinus
Plotinus’s use of ἐξαίϕνης mirrors Plato’s insofar as both philosophers employ it as
a sign for a transformative illumination experience, although of the two, only Plato—in
his Parmenides—offers a conceptual treatment of the term. Both thinkers describe the
assimilation of Idea and soul (although Plotinus does so much more explicitly), and both
describe the pivotal moment of interiorization with ἐξαίϕνης as the byword instantiating
this mystical union.
From the thematic presentation of “the instant” (τὸ ἐξαίϕνης) in Parmenides, to the
prisoner “suddenly” (ἐξαίϕνης) liberated in the allegory of the cave, to the revelation
of Beauty itself happening “all of a sudden” (ἐξαίϕνης) in Symposium, to the peak of
philosophical education “suddenly” (ἐξαίϕνης) coming into view in the Seventh Letter,
ἐξαίϕνης pops up in some of the most notable passages of Plato’s works. Likewise, Paul’s
conversion experience on the road to Damascus repeated twice in Acts of the Apostles
and accompanied both times by ἐξαίϕνης, echoes Plato’s use of the term. Furthermore, in
Plotinus’s Enneads, ἐξαίϕνης surfaces in V.3.17 when the soul “suddenly” (ἐξαίϕνης) receives the light of the One-Good, in V.5.3 as the majestic One-Good “suddenly” (ἐξαίϕνης)
reveals itself, in V.5.7 when the self and the One-Good “suddenly” (ἐξαίϕνης) assimilate,
again in VI.7.34 as the soul “suddenly” (ἐξαίϕνης) embraces the One-Good, and finally
in VI.7.36 as the spiritually immanent self “suddenly” (ἐξαίϕνης) merges with the divine
transcendence of the One-Good.
Whether Plato inspired succeeding thinkers regarding the use of ἐξαίϕνης or if these
curious subsequent appearances of the term signify a shared insight lingers as an open
question. On the one hand, the question concerning the intention of the author of Acts and
if he was indeed consciously trading upon Plato’s notion of ἐξαίϕνης remains unanswerable, highly suggestive though it may be. On the other hand, Plotinus’s appropriation of
Plato’s philosophy is undeniable, as Plotinus himself readily acknowledges in V.1.8: “these
statements of ours are not new; they do not belong to the present time, but were made long
ago, not explicitly, and what we have said in this discussion has been an interpretation of
them, relying on Plato’s own writings for evidence that these views are ancient”. Whether
Plotinus’s understanding of Platonic philosophy corresponds to Plato’s own or if Neoplatonism is an altogether new and distinctive philosophy, of course, remains a matter of
scholarly dispute. Nevertheless, as the most renowned Platonist of late antiquity, Plotinus
saw his life’s work as clarifying and communicating Plato’s thought for a new generation
of philosophers. Like Plato, he sought and discovered eternity in the transitory. Thus,
the emergence of “this strange creature”—ἐξαίϕνης—in his Enneads should come as no
surprise.
6. Conclusions
Although the above examples offer a transcendent, otherworldly kind of conversion
experience narrative, when Plato describes the illumination of the highest realities in his
Seventh Letter, he warns those reading this account against “an exaggerated and foolish elation, as if they had discovered something grand” (341e5–6). Likewise, we believe something
approximating conversion experiences occur rather frequently in all aspects of everyday
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life.28 For example, it occurs when we suddenly understand a concept or an argument we
previously struggled to grasp or when we have an insight about a particular topic, e.g.,
human nature, the problem of evil, etc., that we have been studying for some time.
On the other end of the spectrum, the illumination experience can also take the form
of a mystical, ecstatic, profound encounter with the divine described in the passages
from Plato, Paul’s conversion experience in Acts, and Plotinus’ Enneads. Presumably, we
can undergo a range of different conversion experiences from the more ordinary ones in
the classroom to the more extraordinary ones described in these texts. Nevertheless, the
common denominator would seem to be a “flash of lightning illumining the darkness,” as
Augustine describes it in his City of God (Augustine 1950, IX.16).29 Thus, “illumination”
and “conversion” need not designate one specific type of experience but rather an entire
range or spectrum of experiences. Perhaps we all partake of certain smoldering truths,
which, like a spark, might ignite suddenly and illuminate a different way.30
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Notes
1
2

The Latin verb convertere means “to turn around; to transform”.
Nock (1933, p. 14), argues that outside of Christianity and Judaism, the “only context” one could discover conversion experiences
in ancient literature appears in the realm of philosophy. For example, Apollodorus, the narrator of Plato’s Symposium, examines
himself before discovering philosophy. According to Apollodorus, prior to meeting Socrates, he “drifted aimlessly,” and critiques
his former way of life: “Of course, I used to think that what I was doing was important, but in fact I was the most worthless man
on earth - as bad as you are this very moment: I used to think philosophy was the last thing a man should do” (173a). Following
his conversion to the philosophical life, though, Apollodorus says his “greatest pleasure comes from philosophical conversation,
even if I’m only a listener” (173c).

3

More recent scholarship on the pivotal role of ἐξαίϕνης in Plato’s works include (McGinley 2009; Gordon 2010; Rangos
2014; Cimakasky 2017). Some scholars, e.g., (McNeill 1999; Backman 2007), examine Plato’s use of ἐξαίϕνης as a prelude for
interpretations of similar concepts such as Martin Heidegger’s “moment of vision”.

4

Our friend Dakota Eckenrode once suggested it is possible ancient Greek readers, or more accurately, listeners, would have
recognized ἐξαίϕνης for its worrying connotations when it emerges in Plato’s dialogues, and thus the dark undertones of the
term itself would attune the reader more intensely to the passage in which it appears.

5

If the Ideas are conceived as atemporal, then the use of the word “motion” and its cognates should be understood analogically.

6

For a more comprehensive treatment of participation among the Ideas, see especially “The Enduring Charm of Plato’s Unwritten
Doctrines" by Ron Polansky and Patrick Macfarlane in Philosophy, Competition and the Good Life. Furthermore, Michael Wiitala’s
“The Argument against the Friends of the Forms Revisited: Sophist 248a4–249d5” provides an account of how the Ideas affect and
particpate with each other (Polansky and MacFarlane 2005; Wiitala 2018).

7

Of the scholars designating it as the third hypothesis, most notable are the Neoplatonists. Many commentators, e.g., (Cornford
1957, p. 194; Meinwald 1991, pp. 124–29; Miller 1986, 251n53; Sayre 1996, pp. 240–41; Scolnicov 2003, p. 134; Turnbull 1998,
p. 112), count eight hypotheses. Allen (1983, p. 261) tallies four hypotheses with two deductions each, except for the first
hypothesis with three deductions. The Neoplatonists, e.g., (Proclus 1987, pp. 402–3), typically count nine hypotheses, with the
numbering relating to their theory of emanation.

8

When Plato employs “three” or “third” in other dialogues, it is often at a point of a dialogue’s crescendo, or simply, an indication
a significant breakthrough has occurred. Plotinus, in Ennead V.1.8, links Plato’s use of three with his theory of emanation: “This is
the reason why Plato says that all things are threefold ‘about the king of all’—he means the primary realities—and ‘the second
about the second and the third about the third.’ But he also says that there is a ‘father of the cause,’ meaning Intellect by ‘the
cause:’ for Intellect is his craftsman; and he says that it makes Soul in that ‘mixing-bowl’ he speaks of. And the father of Intellect
which is the cause he calls the Good”.
In contrast to Aristotle’s “now” (νῦν) as presented in Physics iv.11–13, Plato’s “instant” (ἐξαίϕνης) stands outside of time.
Aristotle’s “now” provides an orderly account of the division and constancy of continuous and linear time. Plato’s “instant,” in

9
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contrast, is as Sayre (1996, p. 248) explains, a “disruption . . . that is required for change to take place at all”. Thus, Aristotle’s
conception of “the now” offers an organized, structured view of time, while Plato’s “instant” reveals a temporality interrupted,
disrupted, and pervaded by timelessness.
10

“Again, the crucial point at [156c6-d1] is that there is a being that is not in time,” explains (Sanday 2015, p. 144), “and that the
‘one’ must ‘be’ in a way that is not temporally determinate.”

11

᾿Εξαίϕνης appears twice more in the cave allegory: (1) at 516a3 the prisoner is unable “at first” (ἐξαίϕνης) to see the realities
outside the cave due the blinding light of the sun, and (2) at 516e3 when the prisoner “suddenly” (ἐξαίϕνης) returns to the
darkness of the cave. Our friend, Ron Polansky, suggests all three appearances of ἐξαίϕνης constitute the vision of the Good.

12

In relating the hypotheses of Parmenides with “the final and highest mystery” of love, Gordon (2010, p. 277), argues “Diotima’s
own account of erotic fulfillment is itself a hypothesis. Her description of the person who might succeed in grasping the idealized
objects of eros is expressed in conditional or hypothetical terms, relying on the optative mood and several ‘if’ clauses”. See
especially Symposium 211d1–212b1.

13

Allen (1991, p. 82), links the sudden revelation of Beauty itself with ancient Greek religious practices: “Beauty itself . . . is
revealed to the lover ‘suddenly,’ ‘in an instant,’ in an act of intellectual intuition, as the sacred objects of the mystery religions
were suddenly revealed to the eyes of the worshippers in a blaze of light”.

14

In fact, the conceptual framework and language that Diotima employs to describe Beauty itself in Symposium 211a2-b5 mirrors
the training exercise of Parmenides. Miller 1986, 194 affirms that “there is a distinctly Parmenidean cast to Diotima’s account of the
Beautiful”.
Rosen (1999), xx observes “the vision of the beautiful itself seems to have as a direct consequence, not speeches, but true instances
of virtue, or what one may fairly call a beautiful soul”.

15

16

17

The status of the Seventh Letter—whether it is genuinely Plato’s or a skillful forgery—remains a matter of scholarly dispute.
Nevertheless, regarding Plato’s efforts to persuade Dion’s friends against a violent revolt, Lewis (2000, p. 24) contends: “If
we take this rhetorical element with sufficient seriousness, we will see that the content of the letter is fully consistent with the
teachings of the political dialogues, a point that tells in favor of the authenticity of the letter”. In a similar vein, the use of
ἐξαίϕνης, in a context mirroring other appearances in the Platonic corpus, would likewise support the authenticity of the Seventh
Letter.
Morrow (1929, p. 327) writes concerning the Seventh Letter, “Historians from Plutarch to Eduard Meyer have made free and
confident use of its historical material for reconstructing the history of Syracuse in the fourth century, and therefore may be said
to have accepted it as an authentic document”.

18

Regarding the letter’s “rhetorical structure,” Lewis (2000, p. 25) concludes, “the aim of the letter is protreptic”. Plato attempts to
turn Dion’s associates away from political discord and violence and toward friendship and political concord. In other words,
Plato attempts to convert Dion’s friends to a better perspective.

19

Concerning the conversation preceding the conversion experience, Morrow (1929, p. 344) contends, “But dialectic at its best
is only a preparation of the mind for an ‘illumination’ (ἔκλαµψις). Without this experience all the preceding labor is in vain”.
Similarly, Sayre (2002, p. 227) argues “Plato wrote most of his major dialogues as teaching instruments to guide the attentive
reader to the kind of insight of which he spoke in the Seventh Letter”.

20

During a discussion of recollection from Meno 81d1–4, Socrates claims “nothing prevents a man, after recalling one thing only—a
process men call learning—from discovering everything else for himself, if he is brave and does not tire of the search”.

21

Gregory Vlastos, in his Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Vlastos 1991, pp. 21–44) accounts for the transformation the meaning
of “irony” underwent following the emergence and popularity of Plato’s Socrates. Prior to Socrates, Vlastos argues, irony simply
meant “deceitful” or “dissembling,” but following Socrates irony “shed completely its disreputable past” and became the “perfect
medium for mockery innocent of deceit” (28). In a similar vein, we suspect ἐξαίϕνης underwent a comparable transformation
due to the influence and popularity of Plato’s dialogues.

22

In addition to the two appearances in Acts, every instance of ἐξαίϕνης in the New Testament signifies the revelation or presence
of divinity. See Mark 13:35–37; Luke 2:10–14; and Luke 9:37–43 in Coogan (2001).

23

Paul’s conversion should be thought of as an abrupt character change, and not as a shifting of religious identification. “The term
‘conversion’ is anachronistic and misleading,” argues Alexander (2001, p. 1039), “if we think of it in terms of a change from one
religion to another. Christianity was not at this stage a distinct religion in the modern sense but a sect within Second Temple
Judaism, promoting one among a number of contested Jewish identities”.

24

“Ironically,” Keener (2020, p. 279) points out, “Paul’s blindness correlates with his new spiritual sight”.

25

“For the Neoplatonists,” explains Hadot (1998, p. 72), “the terms Good and One are used interchangeably to designate the first
principle. For the sage to have knowledge of the Idea of the Good ‘near at hand’ means that he can, thanks to assiduous exercise,
call it to mind at each and every moment, realize the identity of the best part of himself with the Principle of all things, and
thereby become indifferent to external circumstances”. In a similar vein, Polanyi (2009, p. 21) argues that “true knowledge of a
theory can be established only after it has been interiorized and extensively used to interpret experience”.
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26

According to Henderson (1984, p. 69), V.3 represents the “most fully developed and clarified stage of Plotinus’ long reflection
upon human nature and human thinking”. See also (Corrigan (2004) and Deck (1967)).

27

As documented by Diogenes Laertius (1972, p. 329), the rather curious subtitle for the Symposium is “On the Good”. In other
words, one might expect the subtitle of Symposium to be “On Love,” or “On Beauty” just as the other subtitles, e.g., the subtitle
for Parmenides is “On Ideas,” are fairly obvious identifications of the topic discussed.

28

“A certain tendency to insanity has always attended the opening of the religious sense in men,” writes Emerson (1981) in his
Over-Soul, “as if blasted with excess of light. The trances of Socrates; the union of Plotinus; the vision of Porphyry; the conversion
of Paul; the aurora of Behmen; the convulsions of George Fox and his Quakers; the illuminations of Swedenborg, are of this kind.
What was in the case of these remarkable persons a ravishment, has, in innumerable instances in common life, been exhibited in
less striking manner” (199). See also Irwin (2018).

29

Augustine famously documents his own conversion as happening suddenly in Confessions viii. Upon hearing a mysterious
child’s voice chant “tolle lege, tolle lege,” Augustine recites Romans 13:13–14, and describes his illumination experience: “Suddenly
(statim), the end of the sentence was like a light of sanctuary poured into my heart; every shadow of doubt melted away” (8.12.29).
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